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Conditions of Intolerance: 
Racism and the Construction of Social Reality 
Norbert Finzsch*' 
Abstract: The most frightening side-effects of unification 
for some of the Germans and for most of the awed foreign 
spectators was the resurgence of open German racism. Was 
there a racist tradition in Germany that linked 1933 with 
1989? Was the womb still fertile from which fascism had 
crept? Or are these incidents only pointing at a long-term 
tendency in German history that has been directed towards 
exclusion of »foreigners«, immigrants and non-christians 
going back to the early nineteenth century?- The first part 
of this paper describes the different occasions in Germany 
and the United States.The second part proposes six areas of 
comparison one could look at in an attempt to correlate 
American and German concepts of racism, nationalism and 
xenophobia: 1) The early period of nationalism (1812— 
1850); 2) Expansion and Manifest Destiny (1848-1898); 3) 
»Scientific racism« and internal colonization (1870-1933); 
4) Gender and Race; 5) Identity and marginalization; 6) 
Political parties and the racist/xenophobic impulse.- The 
third part discusses the "false" dichotomization of social 
history versus discourse analysis. Social history is 
discourse analysis with non-discoursive practises left in. 
* Address all communications to Norbert Finzsch, Universität Hamburg, Historisches 
Seminar, Von-Melle-Park 6, D-22085 Hamburg; e-mail: 100600.1124@compuserve. 
com oder NFinzsch@AOL.Com 
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1. The Occasion 
1.1 Germany 
German unification can be perceived as the return to normality in Europe, as 
post-established harmony within a nation, as the »growing together of 
something that had belonged together all the way« (Willy Brandt). With 
unification there came the end of dictatorship in East Germany, the discovery 
of the economic collapse of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and the 
repressive apparatus that ensured a quasi-total control of the citizens by the 
state, the demise of the one-party state and the establishment of a liberal 
western democracy. Unification also brought large-scale unemployment, the 
shutting down of large sectors of the East German economy, the dismanteling 
of welfare institutions, kindergardens, community centers and state maintained 
recreation facilities. Unification was blamed by many in the East and the West 
for an increased remarginalization of women in the former GDR and for a loss 
of cultural multiplicity. The most frightening side-effects of unification for 
some of the Germans and for most of the awed foreign spectators was the 
resurgence of open German racism. The sight of fire-bombed synagogues and 
shelters for foreigners, murdered African Germans or political refugees, the 
helplessness felt vis-a-vis skinheads chasing Vietnamese workers through the 
streets of East German towns and the emergence of a political discourse in 
which there was a »foreigners' question« (Ausländerfrage) rather than a 
»racism question« (Rassismusfrage), the double standard of police authorities 
who reacted belatedly if at all, made clear that Germany was far from 
normality. The reaction of the well-meaning majority of Germans in both parts 
of the nation was nevertheless coined by a deep misunderstanding of the 
reasons for the violent appearance of xenophobic thought and neo-fascist 
practice after 1990. Racism, contrary to what public opinion was, was not a 
phenomenon that was limited to the East and, still worse, it had been there a 
long time before unification was even considered a slim silver line on the 
political horizon. Those contemporaries who have been politically active in the 
years before 1990 know that neo-fascist groups, both fighting from the 
underground as acting publicly, have stuck out there heads as early as 1980. 
Antisemitic slurs or violations of Jewish cemetaries have been phenomena that 
have been with the West German public for quite a while, although incidents of 
racist outrages in West Germany have chronically been underreported by the 
media. Antisemitism, the stereotyping of the Jew as the Other as an antitype to 
an idealized German seemed to have been crucial to German Identity even after 
1945.1 Attacks on leftists, anti-semitic graffitti, frequent incidents of 
For the centrality of German antisemitism for the definition of »Germanness« see 
Karl Dietrich Bracher, The German Dictatorship, New York 1970; George Mosse, 
The Crisis of German Ideology, New York 1964 and Fritz Stern, The Politics of 
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gay-bashing, cooperation between seemingly unpolitical hooligans and 
organized and disciplined neo-fascist groups, fights between Turkish youths 
and German right wing radicals was a reality long before the Berlin Wall came 
down. 2 The fact that a majority of Germans in the East as well as in the West 
opposed violence against minorities and organized marches and candle-ralleys 
is politically comforting but it deflects attention from the question, why all this 
could happen. Was there a racist tradition in Germany that linked 1933 with 
1989? Was the womb still fertile from which fascism had crept?3 Or are these 
incidents only pointing at a long-term tendency in German history that has been 
directed towards exclusion of »foreigners«, immigrants and non-christians 
going back to the early nineteenth century? It may suffice to say that one could 
analyze German antisemitism, persecution of African Germans and 
Cultural Dispair, New York 1965. I am heavily indebted to my friend and colleague 
Jeffrey Herf for pointing this out to me. Research on German antisemitism after 1945 
is abundant. See Alphons Silbermann, Der ungeliebte Jude: Zur Soziologie des 
Antisemitismus, Zürich 1981. Alphons Silbermann, Sind wir Antisemiten? Ausmaß 
und Wirkung eines sozialen Vorurteils in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Köln 
1982. E. Simmel (ed.), Antisemitismus: Mit Beiträgen von Adorno, Horkheimer, 
FrenkelBrunswick et al., Frankfurt 1993, repr. Boston 1946. G. B. Ginzel (ed.), 
Antisemitismus: Erscheinungsform der Judenfeindschaft gestern und heute, Köln 
1991. 
2 For the reemergence of racism in Europe see Dimitrios Evrigenis (ed.), 
Untersuchungsausschuß »Wiederaufleben des Faschismus und Rassismus in Europa«: 
Bericht über die Ergebnisse der Arbeiten, Strasbourg 1985. Robert Krieps, Fascisme 
et racisme en Europe, Luxembourg 1983 (Cahiers socialistes europeens 1). For the 
continuity of racist thinking in West Germany see Joachim S. Hohmann, Robert 
Ritter und die Erben der Kriminalbiologie: »Zigeunerforschung« im 
Nationalsozialismus und in Westdeutschland im Zeichen des Rassismus, Frankfurt 
am Main, 1991 (Studien zur Tsiganologie und Folkloristik 4). 
3 Whether racism was a necessary ingredient of (German) fascism is very much 
debated. See among others Robert Cecil, The Myth of the Master Race: Alfred 
Rosenberg and Nazi Ideology, London 1972. Renzo de Felice, Le Fascisme: Un 
Totalitarisme a lTtalienne? Paris 1988. See the latest contribution to this discussion 
by Umberto Ecco, UrFascism in: The New York Review of Books, XLII, no. 11, June 
22, 1995, 12-5. It also should be mentioned that racism in Germany is a phenomenon 
that antedates the emergence of proto- or pre-fascist positions considerably. See for 
instance Reinhold Grimm's contribution »Germans, Blacks, and Jews; or Is there a 
German Blackness of Its Own?« and Sander Gilman's outstanding piece on German 
fantasies about Black sexuality »Black Sexuality and Modern Consciousness«, both 
in: Reinhold Grimm and Jost Hermans (eds.), Blacks and German Culture, Madison 
WI, London 1986. See also Sander L. Gilman, On Blackness without Blacks: Essays 
on the Image of the Black in Germany, Boston 1982 (Perspectives on the Black 
World). On the Treatment of African Germans before and after 1933 see Reiner 
Pommerin, Sterilisierung der Rheinlandbastarde: Das Schicksal einer farbigen 
deutschen Minderheit, 1918 - 1937, Düsseldorf 1979, and Fatima El-Tayeb, 
Schwarze Deutsche im Kontext des Diskurses um »Rasse«, 1900-1933, M.A. thesis, 
University of Hamburg 1995. On proto-fascist ideologies in Germany see Klaus 
Theweleit, Male Fantasies, volume 1: Women, Floods, Bodies, History, Oxford 1987. 
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discrimination of Polish immigrants in the nineteenth century as only preludes 
to a industrialized exploitation and mass murder of foreign workers 
(»Fremdarbeiter«, »Zwangsarbeiter«) and the planned annihilation of Jews and 
Gypsies after 1941. 4 The emergence of the neo-fascist party NPD in the late 
1960s emphasize the importance of the question of a political tradition of 
German fascism. Hoyerswerda, Rostock, Mölln and Solingen, name of cities in 
which racism showed its unveiled grimace, standing for pogroms which have 
become metonymical for German problems after 1989, were the subject of a 
heated political debate in Germany and in neighboring countries. It is very 
telling that politicians across party lines in Germany sought to downplay the 
impact of these incidents as exceptional and untypical with regards to 
anti-German sentiments in countries like Turkey, the United States and Israel 
for instance, while the same politicians took up the theme of the so-called 
»foreigners' problem« (Ausländerproblem) and turned it into political capital 
that could be usefully invested in German interior politics. It is no accident that 
racist terrorism coincided with the political debate on asylum law for refugees 
and the subsequent limitations of the right of asylum granted in the 1949 
constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany.5 
4 The best book on the general problem of »foreign« workers in Germany is Ulrich 
Herbert, Geschichte der Ausländerbeschäftigung in Deutschland 1880-1980: 
Saisonarbeiter, Zwangsarbeiter, Gastarbeiter, Berlin, Bonn 1986. For the Polish 
workers in Germany see Christoph Kleßmann, Polnische Bergarbeiter im Ruhrgebiet 
1870-1945: Soziale Integration und nationale Subkultur einer Minderheit in der 
deutschen Industriegesellschaft, Göttingen 1978 (Kritische Studien zur 
Geschichtswissenschaft 30). More recent Ralf Koch, Die »Fremdvölkischen« im 
Blick der Einheimischen: Polnische Wanderarbeiter in Deutschland während der 
Weimarer Republik, Deutsche Studien 30 (117/118) 1993, 39-56. For the discourse 
on African Germans and their treatment in the Weimar Republic and under Hitler see 
Fatima El-Tayeb, Schwarze Deutsche, and Pommerin, Rheinlandbastarde . The 
literature on German antisemitism is far to extensive to even be mentioned in a 
footnote. I refer the reader to articles in this collection. As an introduction to the 
history of »modern« antisemitism see Hermann Greive, Geschichte des modernen 
Antisemitismus in Deutschland, Darmstadt 1983. The best introduction in English is 
probably still Peter G. J. Pulzer, The Rise of Political Anti-Semitism in Germany and 
Austria, New York, London, Sydney 1964. see also Reinhard Rürup, Emanzipation 
und Antisemitismus: Studien zur »Judenfrage« der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft, 
Göttingen 1975 (Kritische Studien zur Geschichtswissenschaft 15). Rainer Walz 
debates the question whether premodem antisemitism was religious fanatism or a 
form of racism in »Der vormoderne Antisemitismus: Religiöser Fanatismus oder 
Rassenwahn?«, in: Historische Zeitschrift 260 (1995): 719—748. His conclusion is 
that premodern antisemitism must be seen in closer connection to racism as has 
heretofore been admitted. Walz therefore coins the new concept of »genealogical 
racism« to describe this form of antisemitism. 
5 It may be noted that there were racist activities directed against foreign workers 
before 1933. John L. Kulczycki, The Foreign Worker and the German Labor 
Movement : Xenophobia and Solidarity in the Coal Fields of the Ruhr, 
1871-1914,Oxford 1994. 
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Empirical research into racism after German unification is rare, maybe 
because it seems to be such a recent phenomenon.6 Sociologists Alphons 
Silbermann and Francis Hüsens argue convincingly that what happens in 
Germany after 1989 cannot — as it commonly is — be described as hostility 
against foreigners (»Ausländerfeindlichkeit«) because this concept is a 
euphemism concealing the fact that is is not foreigners who are the primary 
target of attacks. West Europeans and Caucasian Americans are not 
discriminated against or victimized. On the other hand, these authors warn, it is 
evident that German citizens of color are indeed terrorized and persecuted and 
that therefore »Ausländerfeindlichkeit« is a wrong concept at best, a political 
ruse at worst.7 In other words, the Other (das Fremde) is defined by the use of 
the category »race«.8 The knowledge that »race« is foremost a concept that by 
definition does not demand an »essential« (biologically defined) reality does 
not stop Silbermann and Husens from ultimately turning down the concept 
because »[...] one cannot speak of a »pure race« or »aryan race« in a biological 
sense [...]«' Racism is defined, according to Robert Miles, as a set of values and 
practices framed as an ideology that constructs a social hierarchy due to 
perceived biological differences.10 The theoretically important advantage of a 
concept of racism that perceives race as an aporetic and ideological concept 
that nevertheless is used to construct reality is therefore given up. David Theo 
Goldberg has argued in »Racist Cultures« that there is no generic racism and 
that therefore one has to historizise the different racisms. 1 1 
»There is no single (set of) transcendental determinant(s) that inevitably 
causes the occurrence of racism - be it in nature, or drive, or mode of 
production, or class formation. There are only the minutiae that make up the 
fabric of daily life and specific interests and values, the cultures out of which 
racialized discourse and racist expressions arise. Racist expressions become 
normalized in and through the prevaling categories of modernity's epistemes 
and institutionalized in modernity's various modes of social articulation and 
6 The selective bibliography in Silbermann and Husens, Der »normale« Haß, 120-4, 
lists most of the empirical studies done in Germany between 1989 and 1994. 
7 Alphons Silbermann; Francis Hüsers, Der »normale« Haß auf die Fremden: Eine 
sozialwissenschaftliche Studie zu Ausmaß und Hintergründen von 
Fremdenfeindlichkeit in Deutschland, München 1995, 4-5. The fact that the authors 
use the term »Fremdenfeindlichkeit«, best translated as xenophobia in their subtitle, 
may have to do with marketing. The term »racism« which is more appropriate, 
according to Silbermann and Hüsers, might mislead potential readers. Both authors, it 
should critically be remarked, remain very contradictive in the use of concepts that 
are supposed to denote racism and xenophobia. 
8 Silbermann, Hüsers, Der »normale« Haß, 8. 
9 Silbermann, Husens, Der »normale« Haß, 7. 
10 Silbermann, Husens, Der »normale« Haß, 8. 
11 David Theo Goldberg, Racist Cultures: Philosophy and the Politics of Meaning, 
Oxford, Cambridge 1993, 90. His earlier writings on the topic of racism include 
Davis Theo Goldberg (ed.) Anatomy of Racism, Minneapolis 1990. 
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power.« 1 2 In spite of Silbermann's and Hüsens's theoretical shortcomings, the 
results of their study are very important, and they confirm what Goldberg says 
about the importance of »learned« racism. Contrary to what German media had 
to say about the reasons why Germans target »foreigners« or »people of color« 
as victims for their attacks, it is not the uprooted segment of the German 
population that is exclusivly receptive for racist positions. Unemployment, 
breakdown of the social network due to the unification process in the East, loss 
of economic status or other factors may play a role in the adaption and open 
acting-out of racist beliefs, but the number of upper middle class Germans with 
a university degree who are open to racist bias is impressive.1 3 For instance, 40 
percent of this group think that German politics in the past have been »too 
friendly towards foreigners« [zu ausländerfreundlich] in comparison to 47 
percent of the whole sample. 1 4 German citizens who have slight xenophobic 
tendencies, according to Silbermann and Hüsers, make up to 35 percent of the 
total population, whereas 15 percent share middle to extreme dislike for 
foreigners or aliens. 1 5 Thus it can be argued that xenophobia is a phenomenon 
that is »normal« in contemporary German society, almost independent of 
religious groups, geographical sections, class and gender.1 6 The only factor that 
evidenüy covaried with xenophobia was the ethnocentric-nationalist attitude of 
Germans. Put differently Germans tend to be most xenophobic or racist when 
they have internalized prejudices during their socialization. These prejudices 
can be classified in three categories, i.e. a) an irrational belief in the cultural 
superiority of Germany and Germans b) the irrational belief in national and/or 
ethnical differences between human beings that collectively justify judgments 
on groups c) an economic chauvinism [Wirtschaftschauvinismus] that justifies 
a leading role of Germany in comparison to other nations.1 7 
The question, whether the »new« German racism was something that goes 
back all the way to 1933, whether itwas the result of sudden social turbulences 
due to unification or whether it was something coexisting with modernity 
within a much larger chronological frame of reference was paramount for the 
understanding of racist discourse and racist practice in contemporary Germany. 
The Second World War defines modern Germany in a lot of ways. The war 
earmarked the height of a catastrophic development of German history. Within 
the war period 1939 to 1945 the holocaust was the culmination point of 
something that can only be described as a racist war of extermination. Both 
»wars«, that war of aggression against »external« enemies and the »war« 
12 Goldberg, Racist Cultures, 90. 
13 Silbermann, Husens, Der »normale« Haß, table 1, 23-25. 
14 Silbermann, Husens, Der »normale« Haß, 24, question 13. See also ibidem, 49-50. 
15 Silbermann, Hüsers, 40-1, graph 4. 
16 There seems to be a slightly higher potential for xenophobic positions in the former 
GDR, although the authors warn of an overinterpretation of the data, which show low 
measures of correlation. Silbermann, Hiisers, Der »normale« Haß, 43—4. 
17 Silbermann, Hüsers, Der »normale« Haß, 99-100. 
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against the phantasma of a perceived »internal« enemy unfolded as one war, 
inseparable from one another. The Second World War/Holocaust ended a 
German »Sonderweg« effectively, both insofar as it integrated West Germany 
in the Western bloc and East Germany in the Soviet camp and insofar as it 
established a western style democracy on (West) German territory which 
remained a democratic society for more than fourty years. In that sense, the 
Second World War/Holocaust marks the »end of (West) German history«.1 8 
The reemergence of open racism in German society after 1989 thus could be 
interpreted both as a relapse into Nazi traditions and as the result of a perverse 
process of »normalization«. This »normalization« started before 1989 in a 
scholarly debate on the comparability of Nazi genocide with atrocities 
committed under the communist regime in the Soviet Union (»Historikerstreit«) 
and was extended into a revisionist public discourse about whether there had 
actually been a holocaust (»Auschwitzliige«).19 The first debate broke out in the 
West German scholarly world and overflowed into the cultural realm as early as 
the summer of 1986. 2 0 It is important to notice that in the debate about the 
singularity of the holocaust in German and international history, most of the 
historians coming from the ranks of a (comparative) historical social sciences 
actually denied the possibility of comparison vis-a-vis Auschwitz and the 
planned and industrialized annililation of Jews during World War II, whereas 
neohistoricists insisted on the possibility and feasibility of a comparison of the 
holocaust with other events in European history.2 1 
Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man, The Free Press, New York 
1992. Fukuyama argues »[...] that liberal democracy may constitute the 'end point of 
mankind's ideological evolution' and the 'final form of human government,' and as 
such constituted the 'end of history.' Ibid., p. XI. 
19 Pierre Vidal-Naquet, Assassins of Memory : Essays on the Denial of the Holocaust 
(European Perspectives), New York 1992 (European Perspectives). 
20 Stephen Brockmann: The Politics of German History, in: History and Theory 1990 
29(2), pp. 179-189. 
21 The literature on the »Historikerstreit« is vast. I only quote the most important 
contributions here: Phillippe Despoix (ed.) Der deutsche Historikerstreit aus 
mitteleuropäischer Sicht, Hamburg 1989 (Osteuropa Forum, vol. 77). Helmut Donat; 
Dietrich Beyrau, Dietrich (eds.) »Auschwitz erst möglich gemacht?«: Überlegungen 
zur jüngsten konservativen Geschichtsbewältigung ; mit einer Bibliographie zum 
»Historikerstreit«, Bremen 1991. Dan Diner Wolfgang Benz (eds.), Ist der 
Nationalsozialismus Geschichte? Zu Historisierung und Historikerstreit, Frankfurt 
a.M. 1988 (Fischer Taschenbücher, vol. 239). Rudolf Augstein (Comp.), 
»Historikerstreit«. Die Dokumentation der Kontroverse um die Einzigartigkeit der 
nationalsozialisten Judenvernichtung, München 1987. Eike Hennig, Zum 
Historikerstreit: Was heißt und zu welchem Ende studiert man Faschismus?, 
Frankfurt 1988. Rachel J. Halverson, Historiography and Fiction: Siegfried Lenz and 
the Historikerstreit, Ph.D. thesis, University of Texas, Austin, 1989. Dirk Kunert, 
Deutschland im Krieg der Kontinente: Anmerkungen zum Historikerstreit, Kiel 1987. 
New German Critique, Special Issue on the Historikerstreit, Ithaca NY 1988 (New 
German Critique no. 44). 
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If Goldberg is correct and race is one of the central conceptual inventions of 
modernity, marked by the formation of the 'West' at the end of the sixteenth 
century and solidified as Western world hegemony in the nineteenth century, 
then the reoccurrence of open racism in Germany after 1989 can also be 
understood as re-entry of Germany into discoursive practices which are labeled 
modem. This identification of modernism with racism need some further 
exploration, because it seems to contradict everything we think if we think of 
modernity. 
At the core of the modernist project lay the insistence on individual equality. 
John Locke's First Treatise on Government (1689) rejected the idea of »[...] 
slavery or property in other persons as a justifiable state of civil society [...]«.22 
But even Locke seemed to contradict his own initial statement on slavery in his 
Second Treatise, because he defines circumstances under which slavery could 
be justified, i.e. for persons otherwise facing death.2 3 So, even the arch-apostle 
of enlightenment justified slavery not only in theory but as the secretary to the 
Carolina Proprietors of South Carolina, he actively protected it 2* If one thinks 
this is at odds with the initial statements in the First Treatise, one should look at 
Locke's theory about human rationality. Anyone behaving irrationally, 
according to Locke, should not be considered a human but an animal or a 
machine. Rationality is the mark of human subjectivity and as such necessary 
to limit the natural equality of those being taken to be human. 2 5 Goldberg 
concludes: »Thus, Chomsky and Bracken are on firm grounds in concluding 
that classical empiricism could offer no conceptual barrier to the rise of racism, 
that historically it 'facilitated the articulation of racism.'« 2 6 Locke's position in 
the definition of racism is a central one, because his influence on thinkers like 
David Hume was pervasive. »Emphasis upon the autonomy and equality of 
rational subjects is a constitutive feature for eighteenth-century thought, though 
qualified by the sorts of racial limits on its extension that we have identified as 
a condition of Locke's conception.«27 
Goldberg, Racist Culture, p. 27. »Slavery is so vile and miserable an Estate of Man, 
and so directly opposite to the generous Temper and Courage of our Nation; that 'tis 
hardly to be conceived, that an Englishman, much less a Gentleman, should plead 
for't.« John Locke, Two Treatises of Government: A Critical Edition with 
Introduction and Notes by Peter Laslett, Cambridge 1963, p. 159 (bookl, chapter I). 
Locke, Two Treatises of Government, 301-2, § 22, Chapter IV »Of Slavery«. Slaves 
are usually »[...] Captives taken in a just war [... and are] by the Right of Nature 
subjected to the Absolute Dominion and Arbitrary Power of their Masters.« Ibid., 
340-1, § 85. 
Goldberg, Racist Culture, 27. 
Goldberg, Racist Culture, 27. 
Goldberg, Racist Culture, 28. He quotes Noah Chomsky, Language and 
Responsibility, New York 1977, 92-3 and H. Bracken, Racism and Philosophy 1978, 
in : Philosophia 8 (2-3) 1978:241-260, 250. 
Goldberg, Racist Culture, 28. 
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1.2 The United States 
It is easy to draw a direct line from Locke's Two Treatises to the Declaration of 
Independence and to the Constitution of the United States. According to the 
Declaration of Independence, there are certain truths that are »self-evident«, i.e. 
that all men are created equal and that they possess unalienable rights. 
According to the Constitution, men should enjoy the pursuit of happiness, a 
phrase that was borrowed from Locke's and that was closely connected to 
property rights, which are also mentioned in the Constitution.28 We have 
learned to accept these truths as the basis of constitutional law of the United 
States and as a precondition of modernity. How can racism thus be in 
concordance with these truths? It may suffice to point out some of the examples 
of racist exclusion in U.S. history between 1800 and 1950, in order to bring the 
seemingly contradiction between constitutional theory and political practice to 
the foreground. 
Racism in the United States has had and still has many faces. Its historical 
form vary according to place, time and people involved. There is a mild, almost 
humorous form of racism that involves the minstrel show and its fictional 
character of Sambo 2 9 and there is the most open form of racist exclusion by 
violent means such as lynchings, pogroms (»race riots«) and upheaval.3 0 
Racism exposed African Americans to such very different practices as slavery, 
unfair wage differentials on the job and »legal« discrimination (segregation) in 
the public sphere of politics among others.3 1 Racism in the United States not 
only sought to exclude Blacks, but also Jewish Americans, Irish Americans, 
Chic anas and Chicanos, Japanese Americans and Chinese Americans, to name 
only a few groups. At about the same time, German fascist developed the idea 
of extermination camps, American racists founded »hate organizations« like the 
Columbians in Atlanta Georgia.3 2 Ties to organized German racism was so 
strong in the United States, that some authors speak of a Nazi connection.3 3 The 
Ku Klux Klan of the 1920s and 1930s targeted African Americans and Jews 
28 Leonard W. Levy, Original Intent and the Framers' Constitution, New York, London 
1988, 276. 
29 Joseph Boskin, Sambo: The Rise and Demise of an American Jester, New York 1986. 
30 Herbert Shapiro, White Violence and Black Response: From Reconstruction to 
Montgomery, Amherst, MA 1988. W. Fitzhugh Brundage, Lynching in the New 
South: Georgia and Virginia, 1880-1930, Urbana, Chicago, 1993. Norbert Finzsch, 
Rassistische Gewalt im Siiden der USA, 1865-1920«, in: Kriminologisches Journal 
26 (1994): 191-209. One of the examples of racist motivated programs against 
Chicanos and blacks are the zoot-suit riots during the 1940s. Stuart Cosgrove, The 
Zoot-Suit and Style Warfare, in: History Workshop Journal 1985 (18): 77-91. 
31 Steven Shulman and William Darity, William, Jr. (eds.), The Question of 
Discrimination: Racial Inequality in the U.S. Labor Market, Middletown, CN 1989. 
32 J. Wayne Dudley, »Hate« Organizations of the 1940s: The Columbians, INC., in: 
Phylon 1981 42(3): 262-274. 
33 Stefan Kuhl, The Nazi Connection : Eugenics, American Racism, and German 
National Socialism, New York 1994. 
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alike in its attempt to control migration of Catholics, Blacks and Jews into the 
Midwest and presently the KKK experiences a resurgence.3 4 
Mexican Americans, Californios and Chícanos were among the groups that 
suffered discrimination as early as 1848, after the aquisition of Mexican 
territories as a result of the Mexican-American War.3 5 Chícanos and African 
Americans until today experience racial/ethnic differences in criminal 
sentencing, as can be shown by the analysis of recent guilty pleas before 
Californian courts in the 1970s.36 Chinese Americans, whose ancestors had 
come to California during the early days of the California Gold Rush, were 
discriminated from the very beginning of their life in America.3 7 Japanese 
The recent literature on the history of the KKK is vast. It may suffice to quote just the 
most important works published after 1980 here. For an introduction into the older 
literature see the bibliography by Lenwood G. Davis and Janet L. Sims-Wood 
(comps.), The Ku Klux Klan: A Bibliography, Westport CN 1984. A discussion of the 
KKK in the 1920's is to be found in Shawn Lay (ed.) The Invisible Empire in the 
West: Toward a New Historical Appraisal of the Ku Klux Klan of the 1920's, Urbana 
1992. Important for a history of the early KKK are M. William Lutholtz, Grand 
Dragon: D. C. Stephenson and the Ku Klux Klan in Indiana, West Lafayette IN 1991. 
Richard K. Tucker, The Dragon and the Cross: The Rise and Fall of the Ku Klux 
Klan in Middle America, Hamden CN 1991. Kathleen M. Blee, Women of the Klan: 
Racism and Gender in the 1920's, Berkeley CA 1990. Leonard J. Moore, Citizen 
Klansmen: The Ku Klux Klan in Indiana, 1921-1928, Chapel Hill NC 1991. Michael 
W. Schuyler, The Ku Klux Klan in Nebraska, 1920-1930, in: Nebraska History 1985 
66(3): 234-256. The best reference tool for the KKK is Michael Newton and Judy 
Ann Newton, The Ku Klux Klan: An Encyclopedia, New York 1991. The latest 
activities of the KKK are covered in the following titles: Elizabeth Wheaton, 
Codename Greenkill: The 1979 Greensboro Killings, Athens GA 1987. For the 
special treatment the KKK receives in the media and by some legal authorities see the 
article by the Institute for Southern Studies, The Third of November, in: Southern 
Exposure 1981 9(3): 55-67. The same incident is analyzed by Michael Parenti and 
Carolyn Kazdin, The Untold Story of Greensboro Massacre, in: Monthly Revue 1981 
33(6): 42-50. Also important Wyn Craig Wade, The Fiery Cross: The Ku Klux Klan 
in America, New York 1987. Michael Zatarain, David Duke: Evolution of a 
Klansman, Gretna LA, 1990. For the latest antisemitic activities of the KKK see 
Richard Yaffe, The Grand Dragon Runs for Congress, in: Present Tense 1981 8(4): 
25-30. For the Reemergence of the Klan in the 1960s see Baxter Smith, The 
Resurgence of the KKK, in: Black Scholar 1981 12(1): 25-30. For a summary 
treatment of antisemitism in the United States see Steven Bowman, Anti-Semitism 
and Antisemitism: A Review Essay, in: American Jewish History 1990 79(4): 
553-564. Leonard Dinnerstein, Uneasy at Home : Antisemitism and the American 
Jewish Experience, New York , 1987. Leonard Dinnerstein, Antisemitism in America, 
New York 1994. 
35 Norbert Finzsch, »Anti-Mexican 'Nativism' in the California Gold Mines, 
1848-1856«, in: Jahrbuch für Geschichte von Staat, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft 
Lateinamerikas 21, 1984: 283-302. 
36 Marjorie S. Zatz, Pleas, Priors, and Prison: Racial/Ethnic Differences in Sentencing, 
in: Social Science Research 1985 14(2): 169-193. 
37 Elmer Clarence Sandmeyer, The Anti-Chinese Movement in California, Reprint ed. 
(original publ. 1939). Urbana IL 1991. Gunther Barth, Bitter Strength. Chiu Piu. 
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Americans, although fighting against Japan in the U.S. armed forces during 
World War II, were interned in concentration camps in the West of the United 
States.3 8 Not in all cases racist practice was used against specific groups by the 
dominant White Anglo-Saxon Protestant Minority. Groups that are 
marginalized have apparently integrated racist exclusion in their own agenda. 
There is, only to mention one example, open racism directed against Jewish 
Americans by African Americans. The history of black and Jewish cooperation 
is as long as the history of their divergencies. As early as in the 1910s, two elite 
groups of minority leaders - wealthy, established, German Jews and Northern, 
well-educated blacks - collaborated to effect assimilationist policies and 
strategies for their respective minority communities as a response to nativism 
and racism in American society.3 9 African Americans were first among the 
Americans who protested against German persecution of the Jews in Europe 
after 1933, although there was evidence for growing anti-semitism in the black 
ghettoes because of the deteriorating economic conditions in these areas for 
which Jews were held responsible. On the other hand, organized blacks, 
represented by the National Association for the Advancement of Colored 
People, were almost alone in promptly condemning Hitler.4 0 This »natural 
alliance« between Jews and Blacks had never been as natural and easy as some 
observers had wished it to be. 4 1 In the 1960s already there occurred a breach 
Norbert Finzsch, Die Goldgräber Kaliforniens: Arbeitsbedingungen, Lebenstandard 
und politisches System um die Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts, Göttingen 1982 (Kritische 
Studien zur Geschichtswissenschaft Bd. 53), 60-66. Alexander Saxton, The 
Indispensable Enemy: Labor and the Anti-Chinese Movement in California, 
Berkeley, Los Angeles, London 1971. Andrew Gyory, Rolling in the Dirt: The 
Origins of the Chinese Exclusion Act and the Politics of Racism, 1870-1882, 
Dissertation University of Massachusetts 1991. Robert J. Chandler, »Anti-Coolie 
Rabies«: The Chinese Issue in California Politics in the 1860s, in: Pacific History 
1984 28(1): 29-42. Ramon D. Chacon, The Beginning of Racial Segregation: The 
Chinese in West Fresno and Chinatown's Role as Red Light District, in: Southern 
California Quarterly 1988 70(4): 371-398. Bess Beatty, The Loo Chang Case in 
Waynesboro: A Case Study of Sionphobia in Georgia, in: Georgia Historical 
Quarterly 1983 67(1): 35-48. 
38 Roger Daniels, Concentration Camps U.S.A.: Japanese Americans and World War n, 
New York 1971. Richard Drinnon, Keeper of Concentration Camps: Dillon S. Myer 
and American Racism, Berkeley Ca 1987. R. Bill Hosokawa, When Seattle's 
Japanese Vanished, in: Annals of the Chinese Historical Society of the Pacific 
Northwest 1984: 90-94. 
39 David Levering Lewis, Parallels and Divergencies: Assimilationist Strategies of 
Afro-American and Jewish Elites from 1910 to the Early 1930's. Journal of American 
History 1984 71(3): 543-564. 
'"'Bat-Ami Zucker, Black Americans' Reaction to the Persecution of European Jews, 
in: Simon Wiesenthal Center Annual 1986 3: 177-197. 
41 Although it should be noted that detailed historical research in this area is missing. 
See John Bracey and August Meier, Research Comment: Towards a Research Agenda 
on Blacks and Jews in United States History, in: Journal of American Ethnic History 
1993 12(3):60-67. 
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between both groups that climaxed in recent racist accusations of some black 
leaders, among them Louis Farrakhan, leader of the Nation of Islam. 4 2 
Although analysts of this conflict tend to avoid the word »racism« in 
connection with intra-minority conflicts as in this case, it is evident that racist 
assumptions and exclusions even between minorities, it seems, are deeply 
engrained into the texture of American culture. Recently, increased antisemitic 
attacks have been promoted by members of the fundamentalist christian right.43 
The United States do have a racist culture and Germany definitely has had and 
still has one although I am convinced that both differ in many respects. This 
(somewhat premature) conclusion led us to compare the racist cultures of 
Germany and the United States over time. 
2. Theory 
2.1 Racisms 
Racisms involve the promotion of exclusions, or the actual exclusion of people 
due to their assumed membership in racial groups, however racial groups are 
taken to be constituted. Racists are persons who explicitely or implicitly ascribe 
racial charcteristics of others that ostensibly differ from their own group. These 
ascriptions must not merely propose racial differences; they must also assign 
racial preferences or »explain« racial differences as natural, inevitable and 
therefore unchangeable, or express desired, intended, or actual inclusions or 
exclusions, entitlements or restrictions.44 Nation has both a conceptual and a 
social history intersecting with the history of the concept race. Here again, the 
Enlightenment made the connection between deemed national characteristics 
and racial ones. The great nationalist drives of the late nineteenth century and 
the legislation restricting immigration in the twentieth century in the United 
States and Germany were imposed in the name of national self-consciousness 
and were in both countries (implicitly) racialized. In Germany this was 
achieved by founding the definition of citizenship on the basis of German 
»blood« in 1913. In the United States, the fact that immigration quotas 
differentiated between members of different nations (and thus «races»).4 5 
42 Nancy L. Green, Juifs et Noirs aux Etats-Unis: La Rupture d'une »Alliance 
Naturelle«, in: Annales: Economies, Sociétés, Civilisations, 1987 42(2): 445—464. 
Edwin Black, Farrakhan and the Jews, in: Midstream 1986 32(7): 3-6. Earl Raab, 
Interracial Conflict and American Jews, in: Patterns of Prejudice 1991 25(1): 46-61. 
See also Jonathan Kaufman, Broken Alliance: The Turbulent Times between Blacks 
and Jews in America, New York 1988. 
43 David A. Rausch, Fundamentalist-Evangelicals and Anti-Semitism Philadelphia, 
1993. 
4 4 Goldberg, Racist Culture, 98. 
45 David H. Reimers, History of Recent Immigration Regulations, in: Proceedings of the 
American Philosophical Society 1992 136(2): 176-187. 
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The relation between nation and race thus needs to be explored as well. Axe 
both identities involving ties that are unchosen, as B. Anderson suggests?4 6 Can 
race and nation be equated conceptually and by extension racism and 
nationalism? Is it possible, according to J. Weinroth, to explain the relationship 
between both indentities by saying that thinking in terms of race is racism and 
thinking in terms of nation is nationalism and racism at the same time? 4 7 Are 
racism and anti-semitism just »derivatives« of nationalism, as T. Nairn 
concludes?4 8 
In my opinion, it is more productive to think of race and nation as signifying 
intersecting discourses of modernist anonymity. They constitute two discourses 
that may at times run parallel to each other, at other times they may be 
independent of each other and sometimes they may even outright contradict 
each other. Another factor is that of chronology: Discourses come to the 
»surface« at different times, there is no necessary chronological continuity, and 
therefore it is conceivable that discoursive fields »nation« and »race« emerge at 
different times. 4 9 Here again, it is important to historizise both discourses. As 
concepts, both nation and race of course are largely empty »receptables« that 
allow the invention of groups as »imagined communities« according to 
Zygmunt Bauman. 5 0 Bauman, following therein Michel Foucault, identified the 
heart of the modern project as the concern with order.5 1 In very much the same 
way that »nature« is dominated by »reason«, in the same way that »reason« 
makes »nature« transparent by imposing laws of nature and by the 
46 Benedict Richard O'Gorman Anderson, Imagined Communities : Reflections on the 
Origin and Spread of Nationalism, London, 1983, 135-6. 
47 J. Weinroth, Nation and Race: Two Destructive Concepts, in: Philosophy Forum 1979 
16: 67-86. 
48 Tom Nairn, The Break-up of Britain: Crisis and Neo-Nationalism, London 1980, 337. 
49 Michel Foucault, Archäologie des Wissens, Frankfurt am Main, 1973, 71. English 
edition : Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, London 1972 (World of 
Man). 
50 This contradicts the findings of German historians, among whom Rudolph von 
Thadden is very prominent. Von Thadden wants to expand the notion of nation from a 
narrowly defined community of ethnic descent to a nation of citizens 
(Staatsbürgernation). He thus defines nation as a central category of culture by 
claiming among other things that »nation as a space for greater possibilities of 
development does make sense.« According to von Thadden, democracy and the 
democratic challenge make it mandatory to maintain nation as a space of a public 
political discourse. Rudolph von Thadden, Nation muß sein - aber wozu?, in: 
Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht 45 (1994):341-346, 345. 
51 Foucault defined racism as a means to differentiate groups of people in a biologically 
defined sphere. Fragmentation in the interest of a statist bio-power, i.e. order within a 
biological continuum, therefore constitutes the core of racism. Michel Foucault, 
Leben machen und sterben lassen, Tüte-Sonderbeilage »Wissen und Macht - Die 
Krise des Regierens«, Dezember 1994, 15-19. Translation of a lecture by Michel 
Foucault at the Collège de France in March of 1976, first published in Le Temps 
Modernes, February 1991. 
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classification of nature, by design, manipulation, bureaucratic management and 
(social) engineering, modernity commits itself to the idea of constant and 
continuous progress. 5 2 
Another constant of modernity's self-conecption is the notion of a Subject 
that is not a social subject, but rather abstract and atomistic, general and 
universal, »[...] divorced from the contingencies of historicity as it is from the 
particularities of social and political relations and identities.«53 This Subject is 
commanded by Reason and it is by using Reason that it is supposed to mediate 
the differences and contradictions of market and morality, polity and legality. 
Race as an universal idea serves a unifying functions by drawing disparate 
social subjects together in a cohesive unit in terms of which common interests 
are constructed. Race is able to fulfill this mission because it is both sufficiently 
broad and conceptually almost empty. The identity between subjects thus 
provided stretches across time and space, a necessary requisite, because it thus 
allows to take over as its own the connotations of prevailing scientific and 
social discourses. By integrating these connotations, race is able to determine 
scientific and political agendas, to patrol the borders of the application of 
reason. It is one of the prime devices of exclusion.5 4 
How much racist discourse is at the center of modernity and liberalism can 
be demonstrated by looking at the principal texts of enlightenment and its 
utilitarian and welfarist continuation. There is a core of central ideas in the 
writing of thinkers like Hobbes, John Locke, Rousseau, Kant, Bentham, James 
and John Stuart Mill, that identifies them as liberals and modernists. Liberalism 
is committed to individualism and it is founded in universal principles 
applicable to all human beings. The philosophical basis of this broad human 
identity (»human nature«) lies, according to liberalism, within the rational core 
of every individual, in the possibility to be moved by reason. Enter progress: If 
man is reasonable in his/her core then all social arrangements may be 
ameliorated by reform. If reform is continued and carried on on different levels 
(moral, economic, political and cultural) then the result is progress. 
Another result of the application of liberal theory is its committment to 
equality. If all human beings are open to reasonable arguments, if there is a 
common moral standing among humans, then equality of individuals in the 
political and legal sense is mandatory.5 5 In that sense, race does not exist as a 
moral category. A morally irrelevant category between individuals is a category 
that they cannot be held responsible for. Thus liberalism seems to be immune 
against intrusions of racism, since moral judgment is based exclusively on the 
52 Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity and Ambivalence, Ithaca NY 1991, 8.0ther texts by 
Bauman on problems of modernity include Zygmunt Bauman, Legislators and 
Interpreters: On Modernity, Post-Modernity and Intellectuals, Cambridge 1987. 
53 Goldberg, Racist Culture, 4. 
54 Goldberg, Racist Culture, 4. 
55 John Gray, Liberalism, Minneapolis 1986, ix-xi, 45-57. 
16 
deliberate choices made by individuals. Since race is not open for choice, 
liberalism is supposed to be color blind. This statements is at odds with the 
overwhelming record of moral appeals to race in the writings of the areopagus 
of liberalism. Examples for this concern of liberals with race despite the 
philosophical tenets of liberalism are frequent and it may suffice to point at 
three thinkers who stand for the whole group. Kant, a philosopher with 
antisemitic leanings, for instance, in approving David Hume's racist bias 
against Africans, insisted on the inborn stupidity of Blacks. 5 6 John Stuart Mill 
linked the presupposed »uncivilized« state of non-white nations with their 
lacking capability to self-government, thus ideologically preparing 
colonialization of theses nations by Europeans. Thomas Jefferson, 
founding-father of the American democracy and author of the already cited 
Declaration of Independence not only was a slave-holder, but theorized about 
the lesser status of Native Americans in comparison to white Americans and 
Europeans.5 7 
When we say that race is »almost« conceptually empty or vacuous, the 
question is legitimate, what is the conceptual residue of race? It is important to 
note that the minimal significance of race does not so much concern biological 
but naturalized group relations. By this I mean the indentification of race with 
culture for instance, a definition that avoids making reference to biological 
principles altogether. When Margaret Thatcher addressed the issue of British 
politics of immigration in 1978, she cited the fear of Britains of being 
»swamped by people [from ex-colonies of Great Britain] with a different 
culture.«5 8 In this »new racism« race is coded as culture and therefore it is safe 
to claim that it is conceptually possible to think of race in other terms than 
biological (genetical) heritability. 
Racism cannot be reduced to a single univocal model. Any explanation of 
racism for example that rests on the assumption of racism based on 
irrationality, blocks out the fact that racism may very well be employed 
rationally in order to achieve certain ends. Racisms may very well have logics 
of their own. 
56 For Kant's antisemitism see Paul Lawrence Rose, Revolutionary Antisemitism in 
Germany from Kant to Wagner, Princeton NJ, 1990. For antisemitic positions among 
the cultural heroes of Western civilization see Nancy Harrowitz (ed.) Tainted 
Greatness: Antisemitism and Cultural Heroes (Themes in the History of Philosophy 
Series), Philadelphia 1994. 
57 See John C. Miller, The Wolf by the Ears: Thomas Jefferson and Slavery, New York 
1977, repr. Charlottesville VA 1991. Bernard W. Sheehan, Seeds of Extinction: 
Jeffersonian Philantropy and the American Indian, New York, London 1973. Norbert 
Finzsch, Meriwether Lewis' und William Clarks transkontinentale Entdeckung und 
ihre Beschreibung der Indianer im Louisiana Territory, 1804-1806, in: Felix Becker 
et al. (eds.), Iberische Welten: Festschrift zum 65. Geburtstag von Günther Kahle, 
Köln, Weimar, Wien 1994, 783-812, 786. 
58 Citation in Bernstein, Racist Culture, 73. 
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2.2 Comparisons 
It has been argued that historians and political scientists are not supposed to 
confound scholarly interests with political identification. In one of the 
introduction to historiography which were used in German undergraduate 
seminars as late as 1990 one can read that it is one of the »[...] unrelinquishable 
scholarly attitudes« of historicism to do away with anything that could smack 
of ideological tendency.5 9 »Sine ira et studio»6 0 has been the motto for 
historians brought up in the historicist tradition of late-nineteenth-century 
German historiography. In the words of Leopold von Ranke this principle reads 
»1 wish to efface my soul as it were [...]61. Compare this claim to historical 
objectivity to what two leading German Nazi-historians had to say about their 
relationship to »facts« and »truth« and their role within a nation that they 
perceived as finally liberated from the »onslaught« of western democracy. 
Walter Frank for instance, described the positions of German historians vis-avis 
the fascist regime during a speech given on the occasion of the opening of the 
Institute for Modern German History in 1935. Historians, according to Frank, 
were soldiers, both for the Third Reich as within »newly experienced 
scholarship* (»neu eriebte Wissenschaft«). Scholarly objectivity for Frank was 
nothing more than an expression of bourgeois security (»bürgerliche 
Sekuritat«), in which the denounced historians had come to grow up. 6 2 His 
speech climaxed in the emphatic appeal to his fellow historians, when he said 
»To be German means Ernesty. To be German means Thoroughness. To be 
German means Conscience. To be German means to go back to the reasons 
even if one goes to ruin over them.« 6 3 Another well known Nazi Historian was 
Karl Alexander von Müller, who expressed his dedication to the fascist regime 
in 1936, when he took over the editorship of Germany's most prestigious 
scholarly journal, the »Historische Zeitschrift« from Friedrich Meinecke. He 
too spoke of historians as soldiers and of the necessity to adhere to an ideology 
(»Weltanschauung«) that would help to deal with the increasing body of 
historical evidence. Political activism, according to von Miiller, lent wings to 
»Der Historismus hat dieses Ideal aufgegriffen und zu einer gleichsam 
unabdingbaren wissenschafllichen Haltung [my emphasis, N.F.] bei der 
Beschreibung historischer Phänomene erhoben.« Egon Boshof, Kurt Düwell, Hans 
Kloft, Grundlagen des Studiums der Geschichte: Eine Einführung, Köln, Wien 1979, 
p.12. 
Francis R. Goodyear (ed.), The Annals of [Publius C.] Tacitus, Books 1-6, 
Cambridge 1981 (Cambridge Classical Texts and Commentaries 23), I 1,3. 
Leopold von Ranke, Sämtliche Werke, Leipzig 1875, vol. XV, p. 103. 
Fritz Stern (ed.), Geschichte und Geschichtsschreibung: Möglichkeiten, Aufgaben, 
Methoden. Texte von Voltaire bis zur Gegenwart, München 1966, 351-2. Sterns book 
appeared as early as 1956 under its original title »The Varieties of History: From 
Voltaire to the Present«, Cleveland OH. Since the quoted texts are written in German 
originally, I took the liberty to use the German edition. 
Stern, Geschichte und Geschichtsschreibung, 352. 
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historiography. History thus needed the Nazi ideology to be rejuventated, 
according to von Müller.64 
When German fascism was defeated in 1945, it was the historicist tradition 
instead, that was rejuvenated. Apparently political partisanship in the interest of 
the Nazis and the dismissal of objectivity had put historiography in jeopardy. It 
appeared as if the effacement of the historians' souls was the prerequisite to 
gaining independence from political intrusion. Identification with (fascist) 
ideology had done a disservice to historiography and therefore German 
historians stopped thinking about the impact of historical enquiry on politics. 
The abuse of historians in East Germany in the service of a state socialist 
ideology after 1949 did not increase the tendency of West German Historians to 
theoretically tackle the question of political responsibility of historians and 
political scientists. Another tenet of the myth of objectivity was that historians 
should not study the history of problems if they were themselves politically 
involved in them. Objectivity demanded distance and a deliberate effort of 
distancing oneself from the object under study and political or social interest 
was perceived as contra-productive for scholarly work. This is an approach to 
the problem of the »interest of knowledge« (Erkenntnisinteresse) that has lost 
some of its influence in Germany as well as in the United States, but that still 
can be felt in discussions on methodology and theory. 6 5 With the advent of the 
history workshop-movement in Germany, the greater impact and relevance of 
Women's and Everyday history (Alltagsgeschichte) in the 1980s, there 
occurred an epistemological shift in historiography which made it more 
acceptable to write from a position of concern and personal involvement. 
Whole neighborhoods set out to discover and »repossess« »their« history, 
minorities started to write their own history, women's historians (who were 
exclusively female in the early days of German Women's history) could not 
possibly write without being »close« to their scholarly field.66 
Add to this the fact that the neo-historicist tradition has only been questioned 
by social historians of the Bielefeld School and one understands the deep split 
of German historiography in the 1980's. In a way, this new historiography, 
only understandable as the German adaptation of the new social history created 
in the United States in the 1970s, reflected (West) Germany's way to 
Stern, Geschichte und Geschichtsschreibung, 354-5. It is hard to sum up the gist of 
von Müller's article, since it is more rhetoric than historical or scholarly argument. 
Frederic Cople Jaher in 1995 pointed out that a »[...] generation ago the wisdom of 
the profession was that minority groups should not study their own history.« Frederic 
Cople Jaher, Conflict between Jews and Christians and within the Jewish Community 
in America, in: Reviews in American History 23 (1995), 360-363, 360. 
Again, I have to rely on my reader's intellectual magnanimity for not laying out the 
details of this development in this introduction. Gerhard Paul, Bernard Schoßig 
(eds.), Die andere Geschichte: Geschichte von unten, Spurensicherung, ökologische 
Geschichte, Geschichtswerkstätten, Köln 1986, which gives a good impression on the 
variety of topics that were dealt with under the rubic of Everyday history. 
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historiographical modernity. Seen from a methodological point, modern 
(social) history, defined by some historians as a historical social science, by 
others as historical social research, depends on comparison as a heuristic tool. 
This modern interpretation of historiography did away with the older historicist 
notion of »understanding« and the singularity of historical events and processes 
which made it impossible for historians to compare and evaluate.6 7 Theodor 
Schieder noted as late as 1968 that a simple and complete subordination of 
history under the laws of the social sciences was not possible.6 8 In the early 
1970s there occurred a shift of paradigms in Germany - away from historicist 
insistence on the singularity of historical events to a historiography that 
included - at least implicitly - comparison as one of the decisive heuristic 
tools. In the United States this paradigmatic shift had occurred earlier and 
therefore there was more of a consensus among American historians that 
comparative history was worthwhile and fruitful under certain conditions. 
In Germany however, the shift co-incided with the aftermath of the social 
upheaval of the student's movement and amidst the reforms which were 
generated in a social climate hostile to conservatism. Therefore the whole 
debate on social historical research became heated and controversial in a way it 
never had been in the United States. The relationship between German 
historians and the past seemed to shift with this paradigmatic novelty, at least if 
we believe Jürgen Kocka. The new elementary experience of historians in the 
seventies centered around the defining power of collective socio-economic 
structures and processes.6 9 Theses structures and processes are by definition 
general. Historical social science drove to understand the super-individual 
Although it should be mentioned that even Wilhelm Dilthey, the arch-apostle of 
German historicism wrote, that a comparative method was indispensible even in 
relation to individual phenomena. Wilhelm Dilthey, Der Aufbau der geschichtlichen 
Welt in den Geisteswissenschaften. Gesammelte Schriften VII, Stuttgart, Göttingen, 
1961, 3rd edition, 226. In my argument on the indispensibility of compariosn as a 
category of historical understanding I follow my own research. Viz. Norbert Finzsch, 
Reconstruction and »Wiederaufbau« in German and American Perspective: Some 
Remarks on the Comparison of Singular Developments, »Sonderweg« and 
Exceptionalism, in: Norbert Finzsch and Jürgen Martschukat (eds.), Reconstruction 
and »Wiederaufbau« in Germany and the United States: 1865, 1945 and 1989, 
London 1996 (Germany and the United States of America: The Krefeld Historical 
Symposia - Volume 4), forthcoming. Thomas Haussmann analyzes in how far even 
the protagonists of the »new« history cannot do without »understanding« as a crucial 
concept of historical research. Thomas Haussmann, Erklären und Verstehen: Zur 
Theorie und Pragmatik der Geschichtswissenschaft. Mit einer Fallstudie über die 
Geschichtsschreibung zum deutschen Kaiserreich 1871-1918, Frankfurt 1991, 
278-301. 
Theodor Schieder, Möglichkeiten und Grenzen vergleichender Methoden in der 
Geschichtswissenschaft, in: Theodor Schieder (ed.), Geschichte als Wissenschaft, 
München 1968, p. 216. 
Jürgen Kocka, Theorieprobleme der Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte, in: 
Hans-Ulrich Wehler (ed.), Geschichte und Soziologie, Königstein/Ts., 1984, S. 312. 
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constellations of (social) conditions.7 0 Motives of acting persons could not be 
understood by using the concepts of those acting, actions could not be 
understood by the motives communicated by those historical figures and 
historical processes cannot be analyzed in terms of intentional actions alone. 
Therefore, social preconditions needed external hypotheses, implemented from 
the »outside«.7 1 
One of theses external theories and hypotheses was the modernization 
theory, which received paramount importance within historical social science. 
Theories of modernization are conceptionally comparative theories, because 
modernization focuses on the long-term transformations that began in Western 
Europe but integrated the whole world into its dynamics. Theories of 
modernization try to fathom the similarities and differences of societies 
compared and to intergrate them into a common theoretical framework, the 
differences notwithstanding. According to Hans-Ulrich Wehler, the 
modernisation theory was the only comprehensive analysis of historical 
problems, molding theory and empirical enquiry, that could be used for 
historical comparative approaches.7 2 In the 1980s, thories of modernization 
became obsolete and even their most prominent adherents dissociated with 
them to a certain degree. But in spite of the demise of modernization theories, 
comparative history remained a valid and important tool of modern social 
history, nowadays termed »societal history« (Gesellschaftsgeschichte). In this 
new concept, comparison is still important because it is a methodological 
control device for a differentiation between historical individuahty and general 
elements of historical explanation. This includes the comparison of societies 
which are non-western or even premodern.7 3 
On an epistemological level, I argue, that comparison in history is not only 
possible, but necessary, even unavoidable. Cognition and perception are 
defined as constructive processes and not as representations of an independent 
»outward« reality. The Italian historian Giambattista Vico expressed this view 
as early as 1710, when he wrote »[...] if the senses are (active) abilities, it 
follows that we create the colors by seeing, the tastes by tasting, the tones by 
hearing, coldness and hotness by touching.«7 4 Historical cognition and 
70 Hans-Ulrich Wehler, Anwendung von Theorien in der Geschichtswissenschaft, in: 
Thomas Nipperdey; Jürgen Kocka (eds.), Theorie und Erzählung in der Geschichte, 
vol. 3, München 1979, p. 28. 
7 1 Ibidem 
72 Hans-Ulrich Wehler, Modernisierungstheorie und Geschichte, Göttingen 1975, p. 61. 
Wehler was also among the first historians to demand a modern historical comparison 
of Germany and the United States, based on a theory of modernization. »The theory 
of modernization would allow - I assume - to center a synthetic presentation of 
German history around the same focal points, which would allow to structure a 
synthetical presentation of the history of the United States.« Hans-Ulrich Wehler, 
Modernisierungstheorie und Geschichte, p. 63. 
73 Hans-Ulrich Wehler, Modernisierungstheorie und Geschichte, p. 40. 
74 Giambattista Vico, Liber metaphysicus: De antiquissima Italorum sapientia, liber 
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perception therefore depends on the constructive processes of historians who 
define historical reality by decsribing and analyzing it. 
The biology and physiology of human perception works in such ways that 
comparison is an integral part of it. On a higher level than the biology of 
cognition, pertaining to complex entities or systems, this is also true. 
Observation in this context is defined as the operations of differentiation and 
denotation.75 Differentiation is defined as »marking a border« to the effect of 
»creating two sides within one form« - according to Spencer Brown. 
Denotation is nothing more and less than the definition from which side the 
thus defined border will be transgressed.76 Comparison in this sense is the 
logical antithesis of differentiation, because it combines as being-different 
perceived phenomena for the purpose of veryfying the validity of those borders. 
Transgression of borders therefore seems to be the precondition of comparison, 
at least on an epistemological level. To be a historian, therefore, implies 
historical comparison.77 There are at least six problematic areas of comparison 
one could look at in an attempt to correlate American and German concepts of 
racism, nationalism and xenophobia, and I am aware of the dangers of gross 
generalization in proposing these six areas for further research. 
1) The early period of nationalism (1812-1850). 
This comparison would focus chronologically on the »early period« of 
nationalism between 1812 and 1850, with the emergence of a fervent sense of 
American exceptionalism in the aftermath of the war of 1812 and the 
development of a strong national nativist movement, directed against catholics 
and immigrants. In roughly the same time frame, Germany saw expressions of 
a nationalist mood that originated in the wars against Napoleon and became 
part of the »Vormärz« period leading to the Revolution in 1848/49. 
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Niklas Luhmann, Soziologische Aufklärung, Köln, Opladen, 1970, p. 73-81. Quoted 
by Georg Lohmann, »Beobachtung« und Konstruktion von Wirklichkeit. 
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Otto Hintze was among the first German historians to emphasize the general 
feasability of comparative historiography. He maintained however that individual 
history was primary and comparison was a second step. »[...] One can compare in 
order to find the general, which is put as a foundation of the things compared; and 
one can compare, to get a better grasp of the one thing and to seperate it from the 
other«, he wrote in 1929. Otto Hintze, Soziologie und Geschichte (edited by Gerhard 
Oestreich), Göttingen 1964 (2nd edition), vol. 2, S. 251. 
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2) Expansion and Manifest Destiny (1848-1898). 
This comparative framework concentrates on the period between 1848 and 
1918. In German History this chronological scheme correlates with the time 
between the failed German Revolution of 1848, German colonialism in Africa 
with its open racism and its subsequent entanglement in nationalist policies that 
lead to the First World War. On the American side one could mention the 
Mexican War with the aquisition of California, the end of Reconstruction with 
its increasing oppression of African Americans, the exclusion measures against 
Asian immigrants and the Spanish-American War. Internally the US went 
through a phase of extreme racism directed against Latin Americans, Asian 
Americans and African Americans in all sections of the country, although the 
worst expressions of this racism with lynchings and race riots were to be found 
in the southern section of the country directed against Blacks. 7 8 
3) »Scientific racism« and internal colonization (1870-1933). 
In a third attempt to compare Germany and the US, one could discuss the 
diverse attempts to patrol the ideological borders of the concept of race 
between 1870 and 1933. In America, social Darwinism, scientific racism, new 
concepts of ethnology and anthrology coincided with a German debate on 
Eugenics, Anti-Semitism and the development of concepts that led to the 
annihilation of human beings in gas chambers of the Nazi concentration camps. 
4) Gender and Race. 
The topic of this comparative approach is proposed to be the cross sections of 
race and gender in both countries in the twentieth century. In the German case 
one will have to talk about the attempts of liberal groups to change the attitudes 
of the people and the state in regard to sexual politics, as in the case of the 
abortion laws and the persecution of homosexuals. Very often, opposition 
against a more liberal stance in gender matters came from extreme nationalist 
and reactionary groups that played on deeply internalized fears of an ethnically 
and or culturally mixed society. The discrimination of Jews in Germany went 
along with a sexist rhetoric of sexual purity. On the other hand it is hard to 
imagine the Nazi state functioning without the active support of at least a 
substantial portion of German women, be it through tacit agreement or active 
involvement (»Täterinnen« discussion). Here, the treatment of Jewish men in 
the Nazi press before and after 1933, depicted as sexual perverts, lusting for 
»aryan« women, deserves more attention than hitherto given. In America, the 
lynch murders that increased after 1918 and the subsequent political 
mobilization to end these atrocities have to do with concepts of gender in the 
South and other portions of the US. Lynch mobs very often defended their 
Norbert Finzsch, Rassistische Gewalt im Süden der USA, 1865-1920, in: 
Kriminologisches Journal 26 (1994): 191-209. 
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actions on the ground that they defended the »purity« of white women, thereby 
defining race also in sexual terms. The succesful fight against lynch murders 
cannot be understood without the crucial role played by both, white and 
African American women, who opposed the racist attempts to use gender as a 
means to control the African American underclass in the South. 
5) Identity and marginalization. 
On this level of comparison one could try to shift the angle of perception from 
the top down approach to a view that encompasses those groups that are 
marginalized by racism, nationalism or xenophobia. This approach is more or 
less an »unhistorical« i.e. asynchronistic attempt to delve into the problem of 
assimilation under pressure. In how far uses the nation state the concept of 
citizenship over a »longue durée« to exclude »aliens« and how do excluded 
groups react in claiming that they are in fact »citizens«. Phenomena that could 
be discussed include the assimilation of Jews in Germany between 1794 and 
1848 and the struggle for the political and social emancipation of African 
Americans between 1920 and 1960. 
6) Political parties and the racist/xenophobic impulse. 
The idea behind this comparartive level is that both, the American and the 
German political party systems, are relatively stable and that racist and 
xenophobic syndromes seem to be connected to a crisis of the national party 
systems, be it as a structural change or as a formal shift within the system. 
Penetration of large segments of the society by racist/nativist groups seem only 
to be possible during or after the restructuring of political parties. This can be 
shown, we think, for Germany between 1914 and 1933 and for the US between 
1830 and 1860. 
It is evident that a single historian or even a carefully selected group of 
interdisciplinary scholars, united for a conference that cannot go on forever, 
cannot deal with all of the proposed areas of comparison in one book. They are 
desiderata of historical research, and I am aware of the voluntaristic energy that 
is needed for each of those proposals. 
2.3 Discourse versus social history 
Social history is out Discourse analysis is definitely in. As a consequence of 
the »linguistic turn«, literary criticism and literary history have developed into 
fields, in which, based on the writings of Nietzsche and Heidegger and ideas 
brought into the United States by authors like Foucault and Derrida, Western 
rationality has become a focus of critique. At the same time, there occurred a 
shift in what was perceived as »evidence« not only within literary studies but 
also in historiography. Critiques of what is called a »vogue« by some, a 
»fashion« by others, focus on the fact that exactly the same intellectual 
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traditions central to the rise of irrationality, fascism and Nazism are supposed 
to have become components of modern theory. This may be deplorable in the 
context of literary criticism but, according to some critics, it becomes outright 
unbearable if used for the explanation of fascism, racism or studies of the 
holocaust. It is hard, in fact, to confront millions of victims of German fascism 
or of American chattel slavery the on the basis of discourses, if one »imagines« 
at the same moment the corpses piled up in German concentration camps in 
1945. The same, it can be argued, applies to the historiography of American 
slavery and of the thousands of African Americans who were victims of 
lynchings. It is difficult to imagine hundreds of thousands of slaves, barely 
escaped from death by starvation on the slave ship, sold into captivity after the 
infamous »middle passage«, exclusively as part of a discourse. This is not 
intended to deny that there has in fact been in different times and under 
different circumstances different discourses on slavery, racist exclusions, 
racisms and fascisms. The problem we have to tackle, though, is whether 
discourse can embrace »matter«, »reality« and »bodies«, whether there is 
»reality« outside of discourse or whether we cannot escape the iron cage of 
language in talking even about practices. Let me cite just one example: When 
the African American James Irwin was killed by a white mob, his death, as 
cruel and bestial as it was, nevertheless followed a certain pre-ordained pattern 
that bore significance in itself. I quote from one of the earlier books on 
lynching, a 1933 study by Arthur Raper: »Mobs are capable of unbelievable 
atrocity. James Irwin at Ocilla, Georgia, was jabbed in his mouth with a sharp 
pole. Hies toes were cut off joint by joint His fingers were similarly removed, 
and his teeth extracted with wire pliers. After further unmentionable 
mutilations [i.e. castration, N.F.], the Negro's still living body was saturated 
with gasoline and a lighted match was applied. As the flames leaped up, 
hundreds of shots were fired into the dying victim. During the day, thousands 
of people from miles around rode out to see the sight. Not till nightfall did the 
officers remove the body and bury it.« 7 9 
It is important to note that a) the atrocity of the murder of James Irwin, as 
undeniably as it had happened, itself had strong resemblence to a text, because 
it »meant« something to on-lookers and the absent African Americans who 
were supposed to »understand« it as a warning not to transgress the limits 
assigned to them by a racist white majority and b) it is equally important that 
we - as nonwitnesses - know about this event from texts like that by Draper 
only. We have no access to that death except through texts. 
One of the most eminent historians of Germany, Jane Caplan, expressed 
serious doubts about the applicability of deconstruction in history as follows: « 
[...] what can one usefully say about National Socialism as an ideology or a 
Arthur F. Raper, The Tragedy of Lynching, Montclair NJ 1969, first edition [Chapel 
Hill] 1933 (Patterson Smith Reprint Series in Criminology, Law Enforcement, and 
Social Problems, publication No. 25), 6-7. 
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political movement and regime via theories that appear to discount rationality 
as a mode of explanation, that resist the claims of truth, relativize and 
dissiminate power, cannot assign responsibility clearly, and do not privilege 
(one) truth or morality over (multiple) interpretations?«80 
In order to be fair, though, it is important, that there are as many postmodern 
theories as there is coal in Manchester. Deconstruction may be the least useful 
theory in coping with problems of racism and National Socialism. But it should 
be noted too, that rationality is by no means a safeguard against racist 
discourses and racist practices, as I have tried to show in concordance with 
Goldberg earlier. It is too easy to dismiss postmodern theory in history 
generally as a case of historical amnesia or historical ignorance. One of the 
most influential postmodern theoretical contributions to the wide field of 
discourse analysis was Foucault's writings, but other authors would have to be 
quoted as well, if the picture is supposed to be complete. I do not want to add 
my observations on the apparent re-discovery of Foucault in recent years or 
point out to the fact that even his impact may finally be felt in German 
historiography which is traditionally less open to theoretical innovation and in 
which the Bielefeld school still exerts the major influence.81 Foucault, who is 
often quoted in the debate between postmodern »scholars of discourse« and 
»modern« scholars of structural social history, does in fact not lend himself 
easily for an abuse as a propagandist of discourse analysis as the only viable 
way of dealing with historical complex problems. To select Foucault as a 
starting point in this debate is also appropriate, because his thinking contains 
many connections to more recent schools as New Historicism, Cultural Poetics 
or Cultural Materialism and even French and American deconstruction. Some 
of those links can be defined as exchange, some as containment of ideas. 
It is obvious that Foucault does not deny the existence of a (socially and 
conventionally constructed) reality outside of discourses. To make my point I 
will just cite two texts by Foucault, that may be taken as authorative in this 
context One is his treaty on the structure of discourses, laid out in 
»l'Arch6ologie du Savoir«, written in 1969 and translated into German in 1988, 
in which he made clear that history with its relatively recent tendency to avoid 
any resemblance with a »collective memory« of which events actually had 
happened in historic times, had taken a position that turned historiography into 
discipline closer to archeology, because it tended to interpret documents 
immanently as »monuments«.8 2 The other text is »The Order of Things«, an 
archeology of humanities, as the subtitle indicates. So far, the worst 
anticipations of those historians are confirmed, who understand Foucault as a 
Jane Caplan, Postmodernism, Poststructuralism, and Deconstruction: Notes for 
Historians, in: Central European History 22 3/4 (1989): 274. 
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theoretician of the dissolution or 'death' of the individual subject and of a 
discourse that has no political and social consequences in the present.8 3 If 
everything is discourse, according to theoreticians of anti-postmodernism, how 
can bodies have a reality then? 8 4 
This view, however, has a blind spot First of all, discourses are not just 
»talks« or »texts«, there not simply what one finds in the newspapers, if one 
randomly opens the style section or what one can overhear in a casual 
conversations. It is important to understand that discourses are »serious« and 
not just contingent performative »speech acts« ä la Austin and Searle. 8 5 
Secondly, Foucault analyzes discourses according to their positivity, he is, as 
he himself claims, a »happy positivist« and content with this ascription.86 There 
needs to be a certain »thickness« of »texts« or »speech acts« on a serious 
matter that qualifies these discoursive events as discourses. And most 
important, in contradiction to Derrida's famous dictum, there is a »hors-texte«.87 
This »hors-texte«, this , is called non-discoursive practise.8 8 Its domain 
is that of materiality, work and the body. Foucault establishes this area of 
nondiscoursive practise in his attempt to explain what discourse analyses is not: 
It is not a history of the referent, although »such a history of the referent is 
possible without doubt«. 8 9 And he continues: 
»In one word, one want to be abstinent from 'the things' completely; [one 
wants to] »de-present« them; [one wants to] ban their rich, heavy and 
immediate fullness [...]«90 
That means, of course, that there is a rich and immediate fullness of 'things' 
like economic or technical events. This does not mean, however, that those 
areas are sealed off from discourse completely. They are no actual part of 
discourse, but they are bound within discourses. »One has to understand 
discourse as a power which we exert upon things; a practise, in any case, that 
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we force upon them.« 9 1 Here again, we find this conspicuous dichotomy of 
(visible and material) 'things' and dicourse that have a dialectical relationship, 
although Foucault always claimed wanting to do away with dialectics.9 2 What 
is visible ('things') cannot simply be transformed into things that are said. 
Bodies are not simply represented in language and language is no mirror of 
bodies' physical existence, since bodies belong to the realm of things visible 
and constitute unformed matter, a surface, on which language may place signs. 
The body thus is the result of the inscription of language onto that matter. It 
comes into existence simultaneously through the combination of visible matter 
and inscription of signs by language.9 3 
Simultaneity thus dissolves the dichotomy of 'reality' and 'construction' on 
the one hand and 'materiality' and 'ecriture' on the other. Bodies become 
'things' that cannot be dissolved from 'discourses' that shape our thoughts and 
imagination.94 Asking ourselves, whether there is a reality outside of discourses 
and how we have to deal with the 'reality' of burned bodies and tortured flesh 
as evidence of the material side of racism, it is helpful to remind ourselves 
constantly of the simultaneity of body and language. Burns and scars are real 
but they are the ultimate inscription of discourses onto the body at the same 
time. The dichotomization of social history versus discourse analysis is »false« 
i.e. ideologically motivated. We can close this constructed gap by doing social 
history that does not exclude discourses and discourse analysis by including the 
»real world« of non-discoursive practices. Social history is discourse analysis 
with non-discoursive practises left in. 
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